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LOST IN TRANSLATION: DISCERNING THE
INTERNATIONAL EQUIVALENT OF THE
NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES
INTRODUCTION
Congress passed the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) in
1966 to encourage the preservation of nationally significant historic
and cultural resources. The NHPA established the National Register
of Historic Places, which lists resources significant in American his-
tory, architecture, archaeology, engineering, and culture. In 1980,
Congress amended the NHPA to add § 402, which implements the
United States' responsibilities under the 1972 United Nations Educa-
tional, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Convention
concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage
by extending procedural protections to cultural resources listed in a
foreign country's "equivalent of the National Register."'
This Comment focuses on a critical ambiguity in § 402: the issue of
what a foreign historic preservation law or system must consist of to
qualify as "equivalent of the National Register." The ambiguity of
this "equivalency" standard may inhibit the initial identification of
cultural resources that are entitled to the procedural protection of
§ 402, thereby reducing the likelihood that the resources in question
will actually receive the benefits of § 402.
II. BACKGROUND TO THE EXTRATERRITORIAL
EXPANSION OF THE NHPA
This Part reviews the background to § 402 of the NHPA by provid-
ing a brief overview of the NHPA and its establishment of the Na-
tional Register of Historic Places, as well as the regulations that define
and delineate the eligibility process for listing properties on the Na-
tional Register. 2 It then examines the text of § 402 and the circum-
stances surrounding its addition to the NHPA in 1980, focusing on the
World Heritage Convention and the internationalism that led up to
the NHPA Amendments of 1980.3 Finally, it discusses Dugong v.
1. National Historic Preservation Act Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-515, 94 Stat. 2987
(codified at 16 U.S.C. § 470a-2 (2006)).
2. See infra notes 5-34 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 35-54 and accompanying text.
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Rumsfeld and Okinawa Dugong v. Gates, the only cases to interpret
the requirements of NHPA § 402.4
A. The National Historic Preservation Act
The United States enacted the first legislative protections for the
preservation of historical and cultural resources over a century ago.5
The Antiquities Act, passed in 1906, prohibited the unlicensed appro-
priation, excavation, injury, or destruction of any historic or prehisto-
ric ruin, monument, or object of antiquity. 6 In 1935, Congress enacted
the Historic Sites Act, which declared for the first time that historic
preservation was a national priority. 7 The Act provided the federal
government with a limited ability to preserve buildings and historic
sites of national significance.8 In 1966, Congress passed the NHPA. 9
Of all the preservation laws currently in force, the NHPA provides the
most extensive system of protection for cultural and historic
resources.10
The NHPA was established pursuant to a belief that "the historical
and cultural foundations of the Nation should be preserved as a living
part of our community life and development in order to give a sense
of orientation to the American people."11 Along with many other
measures for historic preservation, the NHPA established both the
National Register of Historic Places, which lists resources "significant
in American history, architecture, archaeology, engineering, and cul-
ture,"'12 and also the process codified in § 106, which requires federal
4. See infra notes 55-87 and accompanying text.
5. H.R. REP. No. 96-1457, at 18 (1980), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6378, 6381.
6. Antiquities Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. § 433 (2006).
7. H.R. REP. No. 96-1457, supra note 5, at 18.
8. Id.
9. National Historic Preservation Act Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-515, 94 Stat. 2987
(codified at 16 U.S.C. § 470a-2 (2006)). The impetus for the National Historic Preservation Act
(NHPA) was the "devastating effects" that mid-century federal programs, such as urban renewal
programs, were having on historic properties. H.R. REP. No. 96-1457, supra note 5, at 17.
10. PRESERVE AMERICA, PARTICIPATING IN THE GLOBAL PRESERVATION COMMUNITY 2
(Oct. 31, 2006), available at http://www.preserveamerica.gov/docs/Global%20Preservation%20
Panel%20Report%20-%2OFinal.pdf [hereinafter PANEL REPORT]. The 1966 NHPA expanded
federal involvement in historic preservation in myriad new ways, including building federal-state
partnerships and federal-private sector programmatic partnerships; providing federal grants to
states and the National Trust for Historic Preservation in order to maintain preservation pro-
grams and to develop historic properties; and establishing the Advisory Council on Historic
Preservation. See H.R. REP. No. 96-1457, supra note 5, at 17.
11. 16 U.S.C. § 470(b)(2) (2006).
12. 16 U.S.C. § 470a(1)(A).
1018 [Vol. 59:1017
LOST IN TRANSLATION
agencies to take such resources into account prior to approving any
federal undertaking that may adversely affect them.13
1. The Procedural Protections of the NHPA
The NHPA implements its policies domestically through the proce-
dural protections of § 106 and internationally through § 402.14 Sec-
tion 106 was original to the 1966 Act 15 and is the domestic
counterpart, predecessor, and textual model for § 402.16 Section 106
provides that
[t]he head of any Federal agency having direct or indirect jurisdic-
tion over a proposed Federal or federally assisted undertaking in
any State ... shall, prior to the approval of the expenditure of any
Federal funds on the undertaking.., take into account the effect of
the undertaking on any district, site, building, structure, or object
that is included in or eligible for inclusion in the National Register.
The head of any such Federal agency shall afford the Advisory
Council on Historic Preservation established under part B of this
subchapter a reasonable opportunity to comment with regard to
such undertaking. 17
Federal regulations implementing § 106 specify in detail both the pro-
cedural and the consultative requirements with which an agency must
comply in order to meet its § 106 obligations. 18 First, federal agencies
are required to identify historic properties that may be impacted by a
federal or federally funded undertaking.19 Next, the agency must
identify and give notice of the initiation of the undertaking to parties
with whom the agency is required to consult, including the public at
large. 20 Third, after consultation, the agency must assess whether the
project will adversely affect the historic property.21 Fourth, if the as-
sessment reveals that the agency believes that the undertaking will not
adversely affect the property, the agency must notify the consulting
parties of the no-adverse-impact finding and provide an opportunity
13. See 16 U.S.C. § 470f.
14. Id.
15. Congress amended § 106 in 1976 in order to extend the "take into account" requirement
to properties eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places; the original language
limited the requirement to properties actually listed in the National Register. See Advisory
Council on Historic Preservation, Alternatives for Implementing Section 106 of NHPA: An As-
sessment, http://www.achp.gov/alternatives.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2009).
16. In 1974, the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation enacted the first regulations that
implemented § 106. See Okinawa Dugong v. Gates, 543 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1089 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
17. 16 U.S.C. § 470f.
18. See generally 36 C.F.R. § 800 (2008).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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for the consulting parties to respond to the finding.22 Finally, the
agency is required to continue to consult with the public and the other
consulting parties to "develop and evaluate alternatives or modifica-
tions to the undertaking that could avoid or mitigate the adverse
effects. " 23
Federal agencies have further responsibilities under § 110 of the
NHPA and Executive Order 11593.24 The Executive Order required
federal agencies to identify, inventory, and nominate properties under
their control to the National Register by 1973,25 and § 110 requires
agencies to establish a preservation program continuing these
processes into the future. 26 Section 110 also requires agencies to en-
sure that "the preservation of properties not under the jurisdiction or
control of the agency, but subject to be potentially affected by agency
actions are given full consideration in planning. '27
2. The National Register
The National Register of Historic Places is intended to be a "plan-
ning tool" for identifying properties that are considered significant
enough to warrant consideration in federal decision making. The Na-
tional Register is composed of "districts, sites, buildings, structures,
and objects significant in American history, architecture, archaeology,
engineering, and culture. ' 28 The process for identifying eligible
properties and listing them on the National Register is governed by
federal regulations, which define and provide examples of the types of
properties that are eligible for listing by reference to American
properties that are considered to fall within each of the statutory cate-
gories-buildings, structures, objects, sites, and districts. 29 The Na-
22. Id.
23. Okinawa Dugong v. Gates, 543 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1088 (N.D. Cal. 2008). See generally 36
C.F.R. § 800.
24. See Exec. Order No. 11593, 36 C.F.R. 8921 (1971), reprinted as amended in 16 U.S.C. § 470
(2006).
25. Id.
26. 16 U.S.C. § 470h-2(a).
27. 16 U.S.C. § 470h-2(a)(2)(C); see also Colo. River Indian Tribes v. Marsh, 605 F. Supp.
1425, 1435 (C.D. Cal. 1985) ("[T]he federal agency must exercise caution to assure the physical
integrity of those properties that appear to qualify for inclusion on the National Register.").
28. 36 C.F.R. § 60.1 (2008).
29. See generally id. § 60.3. The regulations define a "district" as a "geographically definable
area, urban or rural, possessing a significant concentration, linkage, or continuity of sites, build-
ings, structures, or objects united by past events or aesthetically by plan or physical develop-
ment." Districts may include sites that are not geographically connected, but rather "linked by
association or history." Id. § 60.3(d). A "site" is defined as "the location of a significant event, a
prehistoric or historic occupation or activity, or a building or structure, whether standing, ruined,
or vanished, where the location itself maintains historical or archeological value regardless of the
[Vol. 59:10171020
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tional Register regulations provide three examples of an "object": the
Delta Queen steamboat of Cincinnati, Ohio; the Adams Memorial in
Rock Creek Cemetery, Washington, D.C.; and the Sumpter Valley
Gold Dredge of Sumpter, Oregon. 30 The regulation also lists exam-
ples of "sites," including a battlefield, a prehistoric cemetery mound,
and the site of a former Pony Express station. 3a
In addition to qualifying as property as defined by the National
Register regulations, a property eligible for listing on the National
Register must also bear some significance for the American people
that elevates it above comparable properties and renders it deserving
of special federal protection. 32 This eligibility requirement has been
described as an inquiry into whether the property has "inherent his-
torical and cultural significance. '33 Federal regulations explain in a
little more detail the criteria by which eligible properties are evalu-
ated for this special significance:
The quality of significance in American history, architecture, arche-
ology, engineering, and culture is present in [the properties] that
possess integrity of location, design, setting, materials, workman-
ship, feeling, and association and ... that are associated with events
that have made a significant contribution to the broad patterns of
our history; or ... that are associated with the lives of persons sig-
nificant in our past; or... that embody the distinctive characteristics
of a type, period, or method of construction, or that represent the
work of a master, or that possess high artistic values, or that re-
present a significant and distinguishable entity whose components
may lack individual distinction; or . . . that have yielded, or may be
likely to yield, information important in prehistory or history. 34
B. The World Heritage Convention
Shortly after the passage of the NHPA, the United States became
active in developing a rule of law for cultural resources conservation
on an international level. In the early 1970s, the United States initi-
ated the development of the 1972 UNESCO Convention concerning
value of any existing structure." Id. § 60.3(l). A building is a "structure created to shelter any
form of human activity." Id. § 60.3(a). A "structure is a work made up of interdependent and
interrelated parts in a definite pattern of organization," such as a large-scale engineering project.
Id. § 60.3(p). Finally, an "object" is "a material thing of functional, aesthetic, cultural, historical
or scientific value that may be, by nature or design, movable yet related to a specific setting or
environment." Id. § 60.36).
30. Id. § 60.30).
31. Id. § 60.3(1).
32. See 36 C.F.R. § 60.4 (2008).
33. Colo. River Indian Tribes v. Marsh, 605 F. Supp. 1425, 1437 (C.D. Cal. 1985); Boyd v.
Roland, 789 F.2d 347, 349 (5th Cir. 1986).
34. 36 C.F.R. § 60.4 (2008).
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the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (World
Heritage Convention), and the United States became its first ratifying
state in 1973. 35 The World Heritage Convention promotes the "identi-
fication, protection and preservation of cultural and natural heritage
around the world considered to be of outstanding value to humanity"
by encouraging state parties to the Convention to identify and create
management plans for cultural and natural heritage sites within their
own territories, by encouraging local population participation in the
preservation of their cultural and natural heritage, and by encouraging
international cooperation in the conservation of other state parties'
natural and cultural heritage. 36 "Cultural heritage" under Article I of
the Convention consists of monuments, groups of buildings, and
sites, 37 and "natural heritage" is grouped into natural features, geolog-
ical and physiographical formations, and natural sites. 38 State parties
to the Convention pledge to protect their own World Heritage sites
and refrain from engaging in activities that could harm other state par-
ties' World Heritage sites.39 The Convention considers the deteriora-
tion or disappearance of any cultural or natural heritage to constitute
an impoverishment of the heritage of all nations.40 Article IV of the
World Heritage Convention affirms that each member state has the
35. Lois McHUGH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., WORLD HERITAGE CONVENTION AND U.S. NA-
TIONAL PARKS CRS-2 (Apr. 24, 2001).
36. United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organizations (UNESCO), World
Heritage Convention, About World Heritage, http://whc.unesco.orglen/about/ (last visited Feb.
10, 2009).
37. Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage art. I,
opened for signature Nov. 23, 1972, 27 U.S.T. 37 [hereinafter World Heritage Convention].
"Monuments" are "architectural works, works of monumental sculpture and painting, elements
or structures of an archaeological nature, inscriptions, cave dwellings and combinations of fea-
tures, which are of outstanding universal value from the point of view of history, art or science";
"groups of buildings" are "groups of separate or connected buildings which, because of their
architecture, their homogeneity or their place in the landscape, are of outstanding universal
value from the point of view of history, art or science"; and "sites" are "works of man or the
combined works of nature and man, and areas including archaeological sites which are of out-
standing universal value from the historical, aesthetic, ethnological or anthropological points of
view." Id.
38. World Heritage Convention, supra note 37, art. 11. The Convention further defines "natu-
ral features" as "consisting of physical and biological formations or groups of such formations,
which are of outstanding universal value from the aesthetic or scientific point of view"; "geologi-
cal and physiographical formations" as "precisely delineated areas which constitute the habitat
of threatened species of animals and plants of outstanding universal value from the point of view
of science or conservation"; and "natural sites" as "precisely delineated natural areas of out-
standing universal value from the point of view of science, conservation or natural beauty." Id.
39. McHUGH, supra note 35, at CRS-2.
40. World Heritage Convention, supra note 37, pmbl.
[Vol. 59:10171022
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primary responsibility to identify and protect the cultural and natural
heritage within its territory. 41
Parties to the Convention nominate properties located within their
territories for inclusion in the UNESCO 42 World Heritage List,43
which is comprised of properties "forming part of the cultural and nat-
ural heritage [that] the World Heritage Committee considers as hav-
ing outstanding universal value."' 44 In addition to having outstanding
universal value, a cultural property on the World Heritage List must
meet at least one of six criteria that assess the significance of the prop-
erty to the human cultural or historical experience. 45
C. The 1980 Amendments to the National Historic Preservation Act
In 1980, Congress amended the NHPA to implement the United
States' responsibilities under the World Heritage Convention.46 The
NHPA Amendments of 1980 authorize the Secretary of the Interior to
coordinate U.S. activities under the Convention, including nominating
properties to the World Heritage List.47 Furthermore, as a matter of
policy, the 1980 Act affirmed, for the first time, that the public benefit
to American citizens imparted by historic preservation laws can also
derive from the preservation of international cultural resources:
41. World Heritage Convention, supra note 37, art. IV.
42. UNESCO, founded in 1945, is a specialized agency of the United Nations with the broad
mission of promoting "international co-operation among its... Member States and six Associate
Members in the fields of education, science; culture and communication." United Nations Edu-
cational, Scientific, and Cultural Organizations, About UNESCO, http://portal.unesco.org/en/
ev.php-URLID=3328&URLDO=DOTOPIC&URLSECTION=201.html (last visited Feb.
10, 2009).
43. 16 U.S.C. § 470a(a)(2)(D) (2006).
44. World Heritage Centre, World Heritage List, http://whc.unesco.org/en/listU (last visited
Feb. 14, 2009).
45. A property may be listed for its cultural significance if it (1) "represent[s] a masterpiece of
human creative genius"; (2) "exhibit[s] an important interchange of human values, over a span
of time or within a cultural area of the world, on developments in architecture or technology,
monumental arts, town-planning or landscape design"; (3) "bear[s] a unique or ... exceptional
testimony to a cultural tradition or to a civilization which is living or which has disappeared"; (4)
serves as "an outstanding example of a type of building, architectural or technological ensemble
or landscape which illustrates (a) significant stage(s) in human history"; (5) serves as "an out-
standing example of a traditional human settlement, land-use, or sea-use which is representative
of a culture (or cultures), or human interaction with the environment..."; or (6) is "directly or
tangibly associated with events or living traditions, with ideas, or with beliefs, with artistic and
literary works of outstanding universal significance." World Heritage Centre, The Criteria for
Selection, http://whc.unesco.org/en/criteria (last visited Feb. 8, 2010). Natural-as opposed to
cultural-properties must meet one of four distinct criteria to merit inclusion on the World Heri-
tage List. Id.
46. See McHUGH, supra note 35, at CRS-2.
47. 16 U.S.C. § 470a (2006).
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It shall be the policy of the Federal Government, in cooperation
with other nations and in partnerships with the States, local govern-
ments, Indian tribes, and private organizations and individuals to
provide leadership in the preservation of the prehistoric and historic
resources of the United States and of the international community
of nations.48
In order to implement this policy and the values of the World Heri-
tage Convention, Congress added § 402 to the NHPA to extend proce-
dural protections to cultural resources listed on the World Heritage
List or appearing in a foreign country's "equivalent of the National
Register. '49 Section 402 declares,
Prior to the approval of any Federal undertaking outside the United
States which may directly and adversely affect a property which is
on the World Heritage List or on the applicable country's
equivalent of the National Register, the head of a Federal agency
having direct or indirect jurisdiction over such undertaking shall
take into account the effect of the undertaking on such property for
purposes of avoiding or mitigating any adverse effects.50
By its terms, the NHPA is distinct from most other domestic preserva-
tion and conservation statutes in that it is clearly intended to apply
extraterritorially. 51
Unlike § 106, its domestic counterpart, § 402 is not implemented by
binding federal regulations. However, § 110 of the NHPA, which
largely pertains to the requirement that federal agencies identify and
submit candidate properties to the National Register, also grants the
Secretary of the Interior the power to develop non-regulatory guide-
lines to assist federal agencies in complying with § 402, and the Secre-
tary did so in 1998.52 The advisory guidelines emphasize that those
responsible for implementing § 402, including agency officials and
contractors, should consult "with the host country's historic preserva-
tion authorities, with affected communities and groups, and with rele-
vant professional organizations. ' 53 The guidelines also emphasized
that a federal agency must give historic properties full consideration
48. 16 U.S.C. § 470a-1(2); Panel Report, supra note 10, at 1 (emphasis added).
49. 16 U.S.C. § 470a-2.
50. Id.
51. H.R. REP. No. 96-1457, supra note 5, sec. 401, at 11 (1996); see also Martha E. Candiello,
The Extraterritorial Reach of Environmental Laws, 70 TEMP. L. REV. 1235, 1236 (1997) (noting
that recent cases refusing to apply the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act have found no
evidence of legislative intent to apply the Statute to exported hazardous waste materials).
52. The Secretary of the Interior's Standards and Guidelines for Federal Agency Historic
Preservation Programs Pursuant to the National Historic Preservation Act, 63 Fed. Reg. 20,496,
20,496-508 (Apr. 24, 1998).
53. Id. at 20,496-504 (Standard 4, Guideline (o)).
[Vol. 59:10171024
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when planning or considering approval of any action that might affect
such properties. 54
D. Applying the NHPA in the International Context:
The Dugong Cases
The leading judicial interpretation of § 402's requirements arose out
of a controversy over the planned construction of a United States mili-
tary airfield in Okinawa, Japan on the habitat of an endangered spe-
cies of marine mammal known as the Okinawa dugong. 55 In Dugong
v. Rumsfeld, the first phase of the litigation, the District Court for the
Northern District of California held that § 402 applied the NHPA to
federal agency undertakings overseas and found that Japan's register
of historic sites was equivalent to the U.S. National Register under
§ 402.56 In Okinawa Dugong v. Gates, a subsequent phase of the liti-
gation, the district court applied the language of § 402 to the activities
of the U.S. Department of Defense and held that the government's
involvement in the planning process for the location of the airfield
constituted a federal undertaking57 that may "directly and adversely
affect" the dugong. The court then held that the government had
failed to adequately take into account the effect of the planned instal-
lation on the dugong as required by § 402 of the NHPA. 58 The litiga-
tion is currently in abeyance, pending the government's compliance
with an order to generate and take into account information regarding
the adverse effects that the planned airfield would have on the
dugong.59
54. Id. at 20,507.
55. Okinawa Dugong v. Rumsfeld, No. C 03-4350, 2005 WL 522106, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 2,
2005). Dugong, which are similar to manatees, are featured in Okinawan creation stories and
are believed by the local people to bring tsunamis. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities
in Support of Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 3, Okinawa Dugong v.
Rumsfeld, No. C-03-4350 (N.D. Cal. June 21, 2004). Dugong sightings are also supposed to be
the basis of the mermaid legends of Okinawan sailors. See Thomas F. King, Creatures and Cul-
ture: Some Implications of Dugong v. Rumsfeld, 13 INT'L J. CULTURAL PROP. 235, 235 (2006).
56. Rumsfeld, 2005 WL 522106, at *12.
57. Okinawa Dugong v. Gates, 543 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1101 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
58. Gates, 543 F. Supp. 2d at 1111. Through an examination of the plain language and legisla-
tive history of the NHPA Amendments of 1980, the court determined that the "take into ac-
count" requirement of § 402 was the same as in § 106, requiring at a minimum the
(1) identification of protected property, (2) generation, collection, consideration, and
weighing of information pertaining to how the undertaking will affect the historic prop-
erty, (3) a determination as to whether there will be adverse effects or no adverse ef-
fects, and (4) if necessary, development and evaluation of alternatives or modifications
to the undertaking that could avoid or mitigate the adverse effects.
Id. at 1104-05. The court derived the minimum requirements of § 402 compliance from the
§ 106 regulations, amended as of July 1, 1980. See generally 36 C.F.R. § 800 (2009).
59. Gates, 543 F. Supp. 2d at 1112.
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The events leading up to the litigation began in the mid-1990s when
a committee serving as an official forum for the discussion of treaty
and security issues between the United States and Japan approved a
preliminary plan to return a U.S. military facility, the Futenma Marine
Corps Air Station, to Japanese control after the construction of a re-
placement facility.60 In 1997, the United States approved a plan to
build the Futenma replacement as a sea-based facility, and the De-
partment of Defense developed non-discretionary operational re-
quirements that designated Henoko Bay-"the area serving as the
most important remaining habitat for the Okinawa [d]ugong," 61-as
the general location for the replacement sea-based facility. 62 In 2002,
the Japanese government determined that the new base should be
constructed over a coral reef in the bay that was adjacent to Camp
Schwab, a location that met the Department of Defense's operational
requirements.63
A group of Japanese and American citizens opposed to the project,
including a conservation advocacy group, filed suit in the Northern
District of California claiming that the Department of Defense had
violated § 402 of the NHPA.64 They asserted that because the Oki-
nawa dugong was listed on Japan's Register of Historic Places, Places
of Scenic Beauty and/or Natural Monuments-a list maintained under
the authority of the Japanese Law for the Protection of Cultural
Properties-the Department of Defense was required to take into ac-
count the impact of the facility construction on the dugong.65 In re-
sponse, the U.S. government contended that § 402 did not apply
because the Japanese Law was not the equivalent of the U.S. National
Register, as required by the terms of § 402.66 The government's claim
hinged on the nature of the dugong as an animal: Because the U.S.
National Register did not permit the listing of animals as animate
"properties" while the Japanese Law permitted the listing of both ani-
mate and inanimate things, the Japanese Law could not be equivalent
to the National Register. 67
The district court denied the U.S. government's motion for sum-
mary judgment and held, as matter of law, that the Japanese Law was
60. Rumsfeld, 2005 WL 522106, at *1.
61. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 27, Okinawa Dugong
v. Rumsfeld, No. C-03-4350, 2005 WL 522106 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2003).
62. Rumsfeld, 2005 WL 522106, at *2.
63. Id.
64. First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 61, at 39.
65. Id. at 36, 37.
66. Rumsfeld, 2005 WL 522106, at *6.
67. Id. at *6.
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the equivalent of the U.S. National Register within the meaning of
§ 402.68 Characterizing the issue as whether the Japanese Law for the
Protection of Cultural Properties was "equivalent" to the National
Register, the court compared the effect and function of the Japanese
authorizing statute on the NHPA.69 The court noted that the Japanese
Law was motivated by an understanding that "the cultural properties
of the country are indispensable to the correct understanding of its
history, culture, etc. . . ," similar to the underlying purpose of the
NHPA.70 A commonality between the legislative role of the Japanese
Law and the NHPA was also present: (1) the Japanese Law is the only
law for the protection of culturally significant property in Japan, (2) it
exists independent of other types of conservation laws-such as those
protecting animals for their ecological value-just as the NHPA is the
primary American law governing historically and culturally significant
property, and (3) it exists independent of environmental conservation
statutes. 71 In addition, similar to the expansive scope of the NHPA,
the Japanese Law covers a broad range of property types, including
"historic buildings, works of art, archeological sites, gardens, places of
scenic beauty, and other 'natural monuments."' 72 Accordingly, the
court concluded, "The National Register and the Law for the Protec-
tion of Cultural Properties thus reflect similar motives, share similar
goals, and generally pertain to similar types of property.
73
Next, the court examined the dictionary definition of "equivalent
74
and determined that the Japanese Law need not be identical to the
National Register, but rather its counterpart, or "corresponding or vir-
tually identical especially in effect or function. ' 75 Comparing each
country's register of cultural property, the court found that both the
Japanese and American registers have corresponding effects-the
designation of the nation's cultural and historical heritage for special
protections-and identical functions-the use of a cultural protection
register.76 The court then discussed parallel statutory roles of each
register's authorizing statute: each focuses primarily on cultural pro-
tection and exist apart from other statutes that regulate endangered
68. Id. at *8.
69. Id. at *6.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. (emphasis added).
74. The court referred to Webster's Third New International Dictionary, which was in effect at
the time that Congress drafted § 402. See Rumsfeld, 2005 WL 522106, at *6 n.2.
75. Rumsfeld, 2005 WL 522106, at *7.
76. Id.
10272010]
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species; each has evolved in a similar direction towards greater inclu-
siveness of natural, as well as cultural, places and things; and each
demonstrates an equivalent "commitment to protecting significant
bridges between human culture and history, on the one hand, and
wildlife, on the other." 77
The court rejected the government's argument that the type of
property at issue-here, an animal-should restrict the equivalency of
the National Register to foreign laws that only protect the types of
property that are eligible for protection under the NHPA. The court
noted that such an interpretation would contradict the international
aspect of § 402 and contravene its express language requiring a law to
be equivalent, not identical, in its scope. 78 Although the dugong, as a
living animal, is not directly equivalent to an "object" that is eligible
for listing on the National Register, the Japanese register listed it for
protection based on its cultural and historical significance to the
Okinawan people, similar to the National Register's protection of
sites accommodating populations of animals that are culturally signifi-
cant to Native American peoples. Although different in approach, the
ultimate effect of both laws is to protect culturally significant ani-
mals.79 The court held that in light of these many similarities between
the lists generated according to each country's respective authorizing
statute, the Japanese Law for the Protection of Cultural Properties
was "equivalent of the National Register" within the meaning of
§ 402.80
Having so held, the court noted that its inquiry could be limited to
the above analysis, particularly in light of the fact that the dugong is
protected under the Japanese Law. 81 However, it proceeded to ad-
dress the government's proposition that, even if the two laws are
found to be "equivalent," the property in question must also qualify as
"property" as understood under the NHPA.82 The NHPA does not
define "property," but it does define "historic property," the term
used in § 402's domestic counterpart, § 106. Therefore, a question ex-
ists as to whether the property must also qualify as a "historic prop-
erty" under the NHPA definition. 83 Noting that the definition of
"historic property" expressly requires that the property be significant
to American history, the court considered that exporting the specifi-
77. Id.
78. Id. at *6.
79. Id. at *7.
80. Id. at *8.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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cally domestic criteria directly to the international context would con-
travene § 402's explicit reference to foreign legislation and the World
Heritage List. The court thus concluded, "[T]he focus is on the prop-
erty's actual inclusion on a foreign list, rather than whether a particu-
lar property would be eligible under National Register criteria.
8 4
Distilling the inquiry down to what § 402 means by "property," then,
removes the need to focus on properties that are significant to Ameri-
can values and requires only that the listed property consist of a "dis-
trict, site, building, structure, or object," as defined in the NHPA
regulations.85 The court found that the dugong fell within the "ob-
ject" category because they are a material thing of cultural and his-
toric value to the Okinawans-who worshipped them as a deity and
who featured them in creation mythology-and although movable,
they are related to the specific feeding and habitat environment of the
Henoko Bay.86 As a result, the court held that § 402 could apply to
the Okinawa dugong, "an animal protected for cultural, historical rea-
sons under a foreign country's equivalent statutory scheme for cul-
tural preservation. '87
III. ANALYSIS
As identified by the district court in Dugong v. Rumsfeld, the
NHPA's § 402 equivalency standard appears to implicate two issues:
the legal role that the foreign cultural property legislation plays as
compared to the role of the National Register, and the nature of the
property that may be threatened by the federal undertaking.88 The
Dugong cases are, at the present time, the only judicial interpretation
of § 402, and as such, the court's analysis provides a useful reference
point from which to begin an explication of the equivalency stan-
dard.89 Section A of this Part examines what role a foreign cultural
property legislation must fulfill in the country's legal system in order
to meet the equivalency requirement of § 402.90 Section B discusses
whether the nature of the property listed for protection under a for-
eign cultural property law affects the applicability 9a or scope
92 of
§ 402.
84. Id. at *9.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at *12.
88. Rumsfeld, 2005 WL 522106, at *6.
89. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
90. See infra notes 93-194 and accompanying text.
91. See infra notes 201-208 and accompanying text.
92. See infra notes 210-219 and accompanying text.
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A. The Effect or Function of the Law
Measures protecting cultural resources exist in a variety of forms
and mechanisms, each unique to the legal and social framework in
which it operates. At the national level, many countries have enacted
laws to extend some degree of government protection to culturally
significant resources that are found within domestic borders. The
UNESCO Cultural Heritage Laws Database contains entries for over
170 countries that have submitted their domestic laws pertaining to
the protection of cultural and natural heritage. 93 As one might expect,
each domestic protection law is uniquely fashioned to fit within the
type of legal system in which it functions. Some of these laws take the
form of national ownership laws, vesting varying degrees of ownership
or control of culturally significant resources in the national govern-
ment.94 Others operate as part of a comprehensive civil code, detail-
ing legal measures for a broad range of cultural concerns beyond
domestic conservation and protection measures.95
Cultural resource protection also exists at the international level.96
The 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property
in the Event of Armed Conflict (Hague Convention), 97 which has
been described as the foundation of international cultural property
law for the modern era,98 states that damage to any cultural property
is "damage to the cultural heritage of all mankind." 99 The Hague
Convention defines cultural property as "moveable or immova-
ble property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every peo-
ple," including buildings that preserve or exhibit cultural property, 100
93. UNESCO, UNESCO Database of National Cultural Heritage Laws, http://www.unesco.
org/culture/natlaws/index.php?&lng=EN (choose "Brochure" from right sidebar) (last visited
Feb. 8, 2010).
94. See, e.g., Greek Law 3028 (2002) (on file with author) (vesting a right of ownership in the
national government and a limited right to physical possession of cultural property-distin-
guished from legal ownership-in private individuals).
95. See, e.g., CODE DU PATRIMOINE [C. PAT.] (Fr.), available at www.culture.gouv.fr/culture/
infos-pratiques/droit-culture/patrimoine/pdf/code.du-patrimoine.pdf.
96. International cultural property law developed out of the rules of war identified as early as
the first century BCE, when the Roman orator Cicero drew a normative line between acceptable
(spolia) and inacceptable (spoliatio) war booty, including in the latter category the excessive
removal of art and architectural decoration from a conquered territory. See Margaret M. Miles,
Cicero's Prosecution of Gaius Verres: A Roman View of the Ethics of Acquisition of Art, 11 INT'L
J. CULTURAL PROP. 28, 30-31 (2002).
97. See Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240 [hereinafter Hague Convention].
98. Naomi Mezey, The Paradoxes of Cultural Property, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 2004, 2009
(2007).
99. See Hague Convention, supra note 97, pmbl.
100. See Hague Convention, supra note 97, art. 1.
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and it obligates state parties to safeguard their own cultural property
in times of peace and in times of armed conflict.101 The Hague Con-
vention currently has 122 state parties, including the United States.10 2
The 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and
Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership
of Cultural Property (1970 UNESCO Convention) specifically ad-
dresses the illicit cross-border trade in cultural resources and provides
a more expansive definition of cultural property than does the Hague
Convention. 10 3 In 1995, the International Institute for the Unification
of Private Law adopted the Convention on Stolen or Illegally Ex-
ported Cultural Objects (UNIDROIT Convention) in order to rem-
edy some of the stumbling blocks-caused by a public-private law
distinction in civil law systems-that delayed the ratification of the
1970 UNESCO Convention. 0 4 The 1970 UNESCO Convention has
since been ratified by seventy states, 0 5 and the UNIDROIT Conven-
tion by twenty-nine states. 0 6
The particular challenge for U.S. federal agencies facing this dispa-
rate set of cultural resource protection laws and treaties is how to rec-
ognize "equivalent" legislation when they see it. The Dugong court
interpreted "equivalency" in the context of § 402 to mean "corre-
sponding or virtually identical especially in effect or function.' 10 7
Specifically, the court found that the Japanese Law met the
equivalency standard because, like the National Register, its effect is
to designate the nation's culturally and historically significant re-
sources for protection, and it functions as the primary legislation for
cultural resource protection, uses the mechanism of a cultural protec-
tion register, and lists a broad range of resources based on their cul-
101. See Hague Convention, supra note 97, art. 3.
102. Am. Anthropological Ass'n, US Senate Ratifies Agreement to Protect Cultural
Resources, http://www.aaanet.org/issues/policy-advocacy/AAA-Supports-the-1954-Hague-
Convention.cfm (last visited Apr. 4, 2009). The United States ratified the Hague Convention on
March 13, 2009. Id.
103. UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import,
Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231 [herein-
after 1970 UNESCO Convention].
104. See UNIDROIT Secretariat, UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported
Cultural Objects: Explanatory Report, 2001-6 UNIF. L. REV. 476, 478-79 (2001).
105. 1970 UNESCO Convention, http://erc.unesco.orgcp/convention.asp?KO=13039&
language=e (last visited Apr. 2, 2009).
106. International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, Status of the UNIDROIT Con-
vention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, http://www.unidroit.org/english/
implement/i-95.pdf (last visited Apr. 2, 2009).
107. Okinawa Dugong v. Rumsfeld, No. C 03-4350 MHP, 2005 WL 522106, at *7 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 2, 2005).
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tural and historical connection to the nation.10 8 This finding appears
to emphasize the aggregate effect of these similarities rather than any
one particular commonality between the Japanese law and the Na-
tional Register. The essential question in light of the Dugong deci-
sion, then, is what baseline legal role a foreign law must fulfill in order
to qualify as equivalent to the National Register. First, however, an
ambiguity raised by the language of § 402 requires consideration: must
equivalency be analyzed in terms of a comparison between the Na-
tional Register and the foreign country's register, or between the Na-
tional Register and the country's underlying cultural patrimony
law?1 09
1. Does § 402 Pertain to Laws or Registers?
By its own terms, the protections of § 402 apply to a country's
"equivalent of the National Register." 110 This rather ambiguous
phrase does not definitively indicate whether the equivalency compar-
ison must be taken between the National Register and a country's cul-
tural patrimony law, or between the National Register and the
applicable country's own "register" of cultural properties. Although
there are other ambiguous terms in § 402, guidance for the definitions
of those terms can be found elsewhere in the statute, whereas gui-
dance for the definition of "equivalency" is absent.
The reasoning used by the Dugong court to reach its determination
of equivalency does not resolve the question. The Dugong court for-
mulated the issue as "whether the Japanese law which designates [the
dugong] for preservation, the Law for the Protection of Cultural
Properties, is Japan's 'equivalent' of the National Register," '111 and it
held that "[i]n light of the many similarities between the lists gener-
ated by the Law for the Protection of Cultural Properties and by the
NHPA, the Japanese law is an 'equivalent of the National Register'
....112 The care with which the court took to name the law that it
determined to be the equivalent entity suggests that it interpreted
"equivalent of the National Register" to pertain to the applicable
country's underlying cultural patrimony law. Evidence that the court
108. Id. at *6-8.
109. For the purposes of this Comment, "cultural patrimony law" refers to primary legislation
on the topic of cultural resource protection, as distinct from "national ownership law," which
vests some degree of ownership of cultural properties in a government entity. A national owner-
ship law would be one type of cultural patrimony law; the NHPA, which does not vest ownership
of cultural property in the U.S. government, is also a cultural patrimony law.
110. 16 U.S.C. § 470a-2 (2006).
111. Rumsfeld, 2005 WL 522106, at *6 (emphasis added).
112. Id. at *8 (emphasis added).
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at times distinguished between this statute and the Japanese register
of cultural properties lends credence to this reading.11 3
Unfortunately, a close reading of the court's full treatment of the
equivalency question muddies the waters. In its analysis, the court
made a series three comparisons. First, it compared the Japanese Law
to the NHPA, finding similarities in motivation, significance, and
scope. 114 Next, it compared the Japanese Register'1 5 to the National
Register, 16 finding each had corresponding effects ("to designate the
cultural and historical heritage of the nation for special protec-
tions")1 17 and the same function ("using the mechanism of a cultural
protection register"). 1 8 Finally, the court once again compared the
Japanese Law to the NHPA, finding that each served parallel roles in
their respective statutory schemes. a1 9
In terms of supplying a definitive answer to the question of whether
§ 402 requires register-to-register or law-to-register equivalency, the
Dugong decision is unsatisfying. Although the court's actual holding
appears to favor an interpretation that the answer is the equivalent
"law," in light of the approach used by the court to analyze the
equivalency question, the answer may well be that § 402 requires an
equivalent "list," or even, perhaps, some equivalency on both
levels. 120 Since the Dugong court never tackled this question head-on,
a legal interpretation of this ambiguity through regulations or case law
remains entirely for the future. 21 However, because the Dugong case
serves as a reference point for this Comment's discussion of
"equivalent of the National Register," the remainder of the discussion
113. For example, the court once cites to the Japanese register by name-the "Japanese Regis-
ter of Historic Places, Places of Scenic Beauty and/or Natural Monuments"-when establishing
that the dugong is a protected "natural monument" as defined by the Japanese Law, which is
distinct from the register. Id. at *3. Furthermore, the court's holding uses both the term "list"
and the term "law," and the context in which they are used suggests that the court views them as
distinct from one another. It compares the lists generated by the Japanese Law and the National
Register, and it then holds that the Japanese Law-not the list-was equivalent of the National
Register. See id. at *8.
114. See id. at *6.
115. The decision refers to the Japanese register alternately as the "Japanese Register of His-
toric Places, Places of Scenic Beauty and/or Natural Monuments," the "Japanese Register," and
the "Japanese list." Id. at *3, *8.
116. Id. at *6-7.
117. Id. at *7.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Although the court directly compared both lists only once, it did so at the heart of its
analysis: it is the registers that the court found to meet the necessary criteria for equivalency
under § 402 by having corresponding effects and the same function. Id.
121. See generally Okinawa Dugong v. Rumsfeld, No. C 03-4350 MHP, 2005 WL 522106 (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 2, 2005).
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on equivalency will proceed with reference to the language in Du-
gong's actual holding: that it is the law which must be equivalent. 22
2. What Is the Baseline Requirement for "Equivalency" Under
§ 402?
Although every country's legal protections for cultural resources
differ in some way from every other, two types of laws predominate:
those that utilize a register system to denote particular, individually
identified cultural properties for protection, 23 and those that extend
protection to an entire class of properties, which may or may not be
individually identified. 124
a. Laws That Individually Identify Protected Property
The National Register itself consists of a broadly inclusive inventory
of properties maintained by the National Park Service that meet the
eligibility requirements of significance and property type.125 Historic
preservation officers at the state, tribal, and sometimes local govern-
ment levels conduct research to identify and nominate properties to
the National Register based on the criteria set forth in the NHPA and
its regulations.126 The Dugong court determined that the Japanese
Law met the equivalency requirement at least in part based on its
mechanism as a register that lists properties eligible for special protec-
tion because of their cultural and historical significance to the Japa-
nese people.1 27 Several countries use a similar mechanism to protect
culturally significant resources.
The French Code du patrimoine is an example of a register-based
system.1 2s The Code is a comprehensive collection of laws that con-
sists of seven livres dealing with core areas of cultural heritage preser-
122. Approaching the equivalency issue from this assumption has the added advantage of
broadening the discussion of which types of outlying systems may serve as counterparts to the
National Register. While laws may differ considerably among different countries, the differ-
ences among lists will most likely be at least somewhat less drastic, if for no other reason than
that the country's use of a list eradicates any difference from the National Register in the type of
mechanism used.
123. See infra notes 125-141 and accompanying text.
124. See infra notes 144-158 and accompanying text.
125. ADVISORY COUNCIL ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES: TWENTY YEARS OF THE NATIONAL HISTORIC PRESERVA-
TION Acr 72-73 (1986) [hereinafter ADVISORY COUNCIL]. The properties' significance need not
even be national; the Secretary of the Interior is authorized by the NHPA to expand the Register
to include properties that are significant to states and smaller regions. Id.
126. Id. at 72, 78.
127. Rumsfeld, 2005 WL 522106, at *7.
128. C. PAT. (Fr.).
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vation, including the regulation of the cross-border movement of
cultural property, public museums and archives, archaeological exca-
vations, and the zoning of historical districts.1 29 The Code defines
"patrimoine," or cultural property, as all property, movable or im-
movable, under public or private ownership, that demonstrate histori-
cal, artistic, archaeological, aesthetic, scientific, or technical
significance.1 30 "Historical monuments" are a class of cultural prop-
erty for which artistic, historical, scientific, or technical reasons, the
state has identified a public interest in designating for preservation.1 31
Historical monuments are either immovable, such as buildings or pre-
historic sites,132 or movable, such as furniture or fixtures. 133 Historical
monuments, which may be privately or publicly owned, are designated
as such by the appropriate administrative authority134 and are thereaf-
ter subject to legal conditions, such as the obligation to maintain a
historical building in good condition and restrictions on activities that
might alter, degrade, or destroy the monument.1 35 In addition to pro-
tections for historical monuments, the Code requires each French de-
partment to maintain a register of natural monuments and sites that
are significant for artistic, historical, scientific, legendary, or pictur-
esque reasons, and activities that may affect a property on the register
are subject to restrictions and permission from the Minister or local
official who is responsible for natural monuments and sites.136
Cultural patrimony laws that call for the registration of individually
significant monuments and sites are the types of laws that most appar-
ently meet the equivalency requirement of § 402. Under the Dugong
criteria for equivalency,1 37 the Code du patrimoine, like the Japanese
Law, appears to be equivalent to the National Register in both effect
and function. Although the Code does not contain an express state-
ment of legislative purpose, the Code itself is a comprehensive set of
rules detailing restrictions on activities that might threaten the preser-
vation of a wide variety of properties that are deemed significant to
the French for reasons similar to the criteria for significance under the
National Register, and the effect of the law is to designate these signif-
129. Id. The Code also details civil and criminal penalties for violation of each of its titles. Id.
130. C. PAT. art. Li (translated by the author).
131. C. PAT. arts. L621-1, L622-1.
132. C. PAT. art. L621-1 (translated by the author).
133. C. PAT. art. L622-1 (translated by the author).
134. C. PAT. art. L621-25.
135. C. PAT. art. L621-1 to 33.
136. C. PAT. art. L341-1; L341-1 to 22. The Code du patrimoine also contains provisions, im-
ported from the Code de l'urbanisme, pertaining to the designation and protection of historic
districts. See C. PAT. arts. L641-1 to L642-7.
137. See supra notes 107-108 and accompanying text.
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icant properties for protection. 138 In addition, the Code is a functional
analogue of the National Register's authorizing statute, the NHPA,
because it utilizes statutory criteria to designate a broad range of
properties for listing on a register that entitles a property to special
considerations and protections that are backed by civil and criminal
penalties. 139 Although the Code covers a much broader array of cul-
tural resource issues than the NHPA, the type of mechanism used is
the same as the National Register-a register of individually identi-
fied properties.140 The Dugong court's emphasis on the Japanese
Law's use of a register mechanism suggests that how a law protects its
cultural patrimony mattered more to the court than the scope of the
law's coverage. However, the court's discussion of equivalency in
terms of the function of the Japanese Law may not have depended
upon its nature as a register; the court also considered its role as the
primary legislation addressing cultural resource protection and the
law's expansive scope of properties protected for their cultural and
historical significance. 141
Not every country is equipped or driven to develop such a register-
based system, and setting the baseline requirement for equivalency at
the utilization of a register that lists individually identifiable proper-
ties would exclude many countries that employ different systems for
preserving their cultural resources. The internationalism that moti-
vated the United States' implementation of the World Heritage Con-
vention142 and the later drafting of § 402 with the term "equivalent,"
rather than "identical," 143 indicates that the question is at least open
as to whether equivalency should be read narrowly so as to restrict
equivalency to register-based laws, or broadly so as to enable more
countries to gain the benefits of § 402's process.
b. Laws That Categorically Designate Protected Property
Many states have enacted cultural patrimony laws that accord the
government an ownership or possessory interest in cultural resources.
Frequently, these national ownership laws share many of the charac-
teristics of a register-based system, such as the documentation and re-
cording of identified cultural property on a government-maintained
register. However, these laws go further by extending government
138. See C. PAT. art. Li.
139. See C. PAT. art. L621-1 to 33.
140. See C. PAT. art. L341-1 to 22.
141. Okinawa Dugong v. Rumsfeld, No. C 03-4350 MHP, 2005 U.S. Dist. WL 522106, at *6-8
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2005).
142. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
143. See 16 U.S.C. § 470a-2.
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control over cultural property that is not yet individually identified on
a list. Egyptian Law 117 is a national ownership law that exhibits
many of the common characteristics of this type of cultural resource
preservation scheme. 144
Law 117 defines "antiquities" as immovable and movable objects
(real estate and chattel) of human creation that are over one hundred
years old and that have historical or archaeological importance as the
creation of Egyptian civilizations or that bear a historical relationship
to the land.a45 The law provides that all Egyptian antiquities are
owned by the state as public property 146 and requires the Egyptian An-
tiquities Authority to register both movable and immovable antiqui-
ties once they are discovered.147 Any person who finds an unregistered
immovable or movable antiquity is required to notify the Egyptian
Antiquities Authority of the discovery. 148 The land on which the im-
movable antiquity is located is subject to expropriation by the govern-
ment, and the physical possession of movable antiquities is
relinquished to the government for storage in museums and ware-
houses.' 49 Furthermore, even privately owned land may be expropri-
ated by the government if there is a possibility that it may have
archaeological importance. 150
Once an immovable property is registered or an archaeological area
is designated, no alterations to the object or the land on which the
immovable antiquity is situated can be made without a license from
the head of the Antiquities Authority, which is issued only after a
hearing by a standing committee, even if the real property remains
privately owned. 151 No licenses can be granted for construction on
archaeological lands, and any other activities that might alter the char-
acter of the land-such as planting trees or removing soil-may pro-
ceed only pursuant to a license from the Antiquities Authority.152
144. Egyptian Law No. 117 Concerning Antiquities Protection (1983), available at www.
unesco.org/culture/natlaws/media/pdf/egypt/eg-lawprtotectantiquitiesl983-engtno.pdf (transla-
tion by UNESCO) [hereinafter Law 117]. As this Comment went to print, Egypt was preparing
to approve a new cultural patrimony law that would provide for stricter control over national
antiquities, including a complete prohibition on antiquities trading. See Nevine EI-Aref, No
More Trafficking, AL-AHRAM WEEKLY ON-LINE, Feb. 4-10, 2010, available at http://weekly.
ahram.org.eg/2010/984/eg3.htm.
145. Id. art. 1 (translation by UNESCO).
146. Id. art. 6.
147. Id. art. 26.
148. Id. arts. 23-24.
149. Id. arts. 23-24, 28.
150. Id. art. 18.
151. Id. art. 13.
152. Id. art. 20.
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These restrictions may also apply, at the discretion of the government,
to land outside the boundaries of the designated area, even where the
land is privately owned.' 53 Law 117 prescribes criminal penalties for,
among other things, hiding an unregistered antiquity from the govern-
ment; intentionally damaging or changing the "distinguishing features
of an antiquity or a historical building"; removing from or adding soil
or sand to an archaeological site or land; and even accidentally damag-
ing a movable or immovable antiquity. 154
Egyptian Law 117 shares with the National Register and the Japa-
nese Law the use of a registration system for identifying and tracking
cultural resources, but unlike those laws, it extends legal protection to
all properties that qualify as antiquities even before they have been
identified and listed for protection by the Egyptian Antiquities Au-
thority. 155 Law 117 broadly designates properties as antiquities that
were created more than one hundred years ago and have some signifi-
cance to Egyptian culture or history, and it establishes criminal penal-
ties for concealing an unregistered antiquity from the government. 156
The nature of this categorical and automatic designation indicates that
Law 117 functions to extend its preservation protections to all antiqui-
ties, movable and immovable, even if they are not inscribed on the
antiquities registry. 157 It follows, therefore, that Law 117 and similar
national ownership laws have an effect that is at least as protective of
historically and culturally significant resources as the National Regis-
ter. In fact, Law 117 is probably far more expansive in its scope of
protection than the National Register because it captures not only un-
registered antiquities, but potentially also both movable and immova-
ble antiquities without restrictions on subtypes of those categories,
such as tangible and intangible property, or animate and inanimate
objects.158 The true distinction between national ownership laws like
Law 117 and the National Register seems to lie in the different kind of
153. Id. art. 20.
154. Id. arts. 42-47 (translation by UNESCO) (emphasis added).
155. The NHPA also extends legal protection to properties not listed on the National Regis-
ter. Section 106 of the NHPA protects domestic cultural and historic properties "eligible for
inclusion" on the National Register, in addition to those already listed. 16 U.S.C. § 470f (2006).
However, unlike Law 117, the NHPA may not protect all eligible properties in all circumstances.
The interpretation of equivalency under § 402-that is, as pertaining to the equivalency of a
country's register to the National Register, rather than its underlying law-would impact the
ability of § 402 to protect properties not actually listed on a foreign register.
156. Law 117, supra note 144, arts. 1, 42-47.
157. See id. arts. 6, 26.
158. However, the general protections of Law 117 and the penalties incurred for violation of
the law indicate that it is intended to protect primarily, if not exclusively, tangible, inanimate
objects. See generally Law 117, supra note 144.
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function that each serves in its respective legal system. Although in
practical terms it may often happen that national ownership laws are
accompanied by a register that lists individual properties as they be-
come known to the government, 159 it is not necessarily true that this
must always be the case.
c. Drawing the Baseline for Equivalency
Can a national ownership law serve as an equivalent of the National
Register if the sole means of identifying properties comes from the
broad designation of certain categories of properties as protected?
Take, for example, a hypothetical Law 117 that remains intact, save
for the requirement that the government register and take physical
possession of identified antiquities. In this hypothetical, the designa-
tion of "antiquity"-for those properties that are one-hundred-year-
old-plus, movable and immovable, and historically or culturally signif-
icant-remains intact,160 as does the declaration that antiquities con-
stitute public property that belongs to the government.161 The
government can still regulate activities and possessory rights that
might affect the. physical integrity of antiquities or interfere with the
government's right of ownership, 162 and it could still impose penalties
for violating the law's proscriptions (although, in the absence of a list
of such properties, this may occur less regularly). 163
In this hypothetical, the designation of an object as an "antiquity"
under Law 117 loses no meaning when a register is removed from the
equation. Government enforcement of its historic preservation law
may become more difficult, and compliance with the law may become
more onerous for those who are seeking to conduct activities in the
country, but properties that meet the criteria of type, significance, and
age still legally qualify for government protection, even if they may
not receive it as much as they would if a comprehensive list identified
those properties by name. 164 However, § 402 does not require that a
law provide a more or less efficient preservation mechanism than the
National Register. 165 It requires only that the law be equivalent to the
National Register. As interpreted by the Dugong court, that would
mean equivalent in terms of effect or function. 166 The hypothetical
159. This is true of Law 117. See id. art. 26.
160. See id. art. 1.
161. See id. art. 6.
162. See id. arts. 13, 20.
163. See id. arts. 42-47.
164. See supra notes 156-157 and accompanying text.
165. See generally 16 U.S.C. § 470a-2.
166. See id.
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Law 117 still has the effect of designating antiquities for protection, 167
and it still functions as the primary legislation in Egypt for cultural
heritage protection, applying its provisions to a broad range of re-
sources that have cultural or historical significance to the Egyptian
nation.' 68 Therefore, the absence of a register that individually identi-
fies properties for protection in this hypothetical has not impacted ei-
ther the law's effect or the law's function.
This reading is not inconsistent with the historical development of
the domestic process for compliance with the NHPA. As far as it is
relevant in the context of a § 402 equivalency analysis, the National
Register functions primarily as an authoritative guide for federal
agencies that are required to comply with § 106's process. 169 Al-
though the terms of § 402 only require agencies operating internation-
ally to consider the impact of their undertakings on properties that are
"on the applicable country's equivalent of the National Register,"'170
agencies operating in the United States are required to identify and
consider properties listed on the National Register and properties eli-
gible for listing on the National Register, based on the agency's appli-
cation of the regulatory criteria and consultation with appropriate
authorities. 171 If an agency that operates domestically identifies
neither category of property, the agency can proceed with its planned
activities.' 72
Initially, however, the language of § 106 required only that federal
agencies take into account the effect of their undertaking on "any dis-
trict, site, building, structure, or object that is included in the National
Register" 73-the words "eligible for inclusion" were not added until
the NHPA was amended in 1976.174' Furthermore, the "eligible for
inclusion" language has been read liberally by the courts to include
properties that are not only officially determined to be eligible for
inclusion by a state or federal agency, but that also qualify on the basis
of literal eligibility under the National Register criteria. 75 In Colo-
rado River Indian Tribes v. Marsh, a leading case on the interpretation
167. See supra notes 156-157 and accompanying text.
168. See Law 117, supra note 144, art. 1.
169. See 36 C.F.R. § 60.2 (2009); ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 125, at 34-35.
170. 16 U.S.C. § 470a-2 (emphasis added).
171. ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 125, at 34-35.
172. Id.
173. 16 U.S.C. § 470f (1970) (emphasis added).
174. ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 125, at 23 (emphasis added).
175. Boyd v. Roland, 789 F.2d 347. 349 (5th Cir. 1986). The regulations in force at the time of
Boyd defined eligible property as property "that meets the National Register criteria." 36 C.F.R.
§ 800.2(0 (1985). Prior to 1979, the regulations defined eligible property as any property "which
the Secretary of the Interior determines is likely to meet the National Register criteria." 36
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of § 106, the court stated that "[w]hat is an eligible property for pur-
poses of NHPA turns upon the inherent historical and cultural signifi-
cance of the property and not the opinion of its worth by the Secretary
of the Interior. 176
By extension, an argument can be made that the Dugong court's
interpretation of the equivalency standard need not be limited by the
language of § 402. Where a foreign state does not require that cul-
tural property be individually identified in order to qualify for protec-
tion under its historic preservation statute, the statutory criteria by
which property is determined to be eligible for protection-in the case
of Law 117, the property's type, age, and historical and archaeological
connection to Egyptian civilizations or land 7 7-fulfill the same role as
the National Register's eligibility criteria: marking a property for spe-
cial protection. This role is fulfilled regardless of whether the prop-
erty is actually registered as cultural property. 178 As a result of the
special protections afforded even to unregistered antiquities under
Law 117, one might conclude that all antiquities as defined by the stat-
ute should be considered "on" Law 117.179
Although such an interpretation of the equivalency standard would
effectively extend the same degree of protection to foreign cultural
property as § 106 does to domestic cultural property, the text and con-
text of § 402 indicate that Congress most likely did not intend to
stretch the concept of equivalency so far as to reach pure national
ownership laws. The clearest indication of this is the fact that § 402
simply does not incorporate the language "eligible for inclusion" as
C.F.R. § 800.3(f) (1978); see also Colo. River Indian Tribes v. Marsh, 605 F. Supp. 1425, 1435
(C.D. Cal. 1985).
176. Marsh, 605 F. Supp. at 1437 (emphasis added).
177. Law 117, supra note 144, art. 1.
178. For example, Law 117 protects unregistered properties by establishing criminal penalties
for concealing unregistered antiquities from the government. See id. arts. 42-47. It also penal-
izes activities that have the potential to harm antiquities that have not yet been discovered. See,
e.g., id. art. 18 (providing that the government may expropriate land if there exists the potential
that it may have archaeological significance). See supra notes 145-154 and accompanying text
(discussing relevant provisions of Law 117).
179. The United States has actually adopted a purely categorical approach to regulating the
illicit import of other countries' cultural property. Under the Convention on Cultural Property
Act, 19 U.S.C. § 2601 (2006), which implements the 1970 UNESCO Convention, the State De-
partment is authorized to enter into agreements with other state parties to the Convention in
order to restrict the import of cultural property that has been illegally exported from the other
country. The agreement prohibits the import into the United States of certain categories of
archaeological or ethnological material. An image database on the State Department website
identifies individual properties that fit within the categories, but those images of individual ob-
jects are only intended as illustrative examples of the categories. For more information and a
link to the CPIA image database, see U.S. State Department, International Cultural Property
Protection, http://culturalheritage.state.gov/index.html (last visited June 12, 2009).
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part of the requirement to mitigate adverse effects on property that is
listed on "the applicable country's equivalent of the National Regis-
ter."180 Section 402 was part of the 1980 amendments to the NHPA,
whereas the "eligible for inclusion" language of § 106 had been added
four years prior, as part of the 1976 amendments.181 Therefore, the
"eligible for inclusion" language had been available to Congress for
four years. Furthermore, the concept had existed for at least nine
years, since an Executive Order in 1971 directed federal agencies to
inventory and exercise caution around properties that "appear to
qualify for listing" on the National Register. 182
This reading of the text of § 402 is bolstered by the fact that a sub-
stantial portion of § 402's language mirrors that of § 106. Both sec-
tions of the NHPA apply generally to the same group-federal
agencies 183-and to the same type of activities-federal undertak-
ings.1 84 Both use identical language, "take into account," in order to
indicate that a specific type of action is required.1 85 Both indicate that
the National Register is the reference point for determining when that
action is required and when it is not.186 The language of § 402 indi-
cates that Congress's choice of words was deliberate, and that Con-
gress probably intended the matching terms to carry a similar
meaning. Thus, Congress's omission of the "or eligible" language in
§ 402 implies that Congress did not intend § 402 to extend to property
180. Compare 16 U.S.C. § 470f (the federal agency shall "take into account the effect of the
undertaking on any [property] that is included in or eligible for inclusion in the National Regis-
ter"), with § 470a-2 (the federal agency shall take into account the effect of the undertaking on
"property which is ... on the applicable country's equivalent of the National Register").
181. ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 125, at 23.
182. Executive Order No. 11,593 required the heads of federal agencies to "locate, inventory,
and nominate to the Secretary of the Interior all sites, buildings, districts, and objects under their
jurisdiction or control that appear to qualify for listing on the National Register of Historic
Places," and to exercise caution when engaging in undertakings that might alter, damage, or
transfer control of those properties until the Secretary of the Interior had the opportunity to
render an opinion regarding the property's eligibility for inclusion in the National Register.
Thus, the "eligible for inclusion" language brought the requirements of Executive Order No.
11,593 directly into the NHPA. Exec. Order No. 11,593, 3 C.F.R. 559, reprinted in 16 U.S.C.
§ 470.
183. Compare 16 U.S.C. § 470f ("head of any Federal agency" and "head of any such Federal
agency"), with § 470a-2 ("head of a Federal agency").
184. Compare 16 U.S.C. § 470f ("proposed Federal or federally assisted undertaking in any
State"), with § 470a-2 ("Federal undertaking outside the United States").
185. Compare 16 U.S.C. § 470f ("take into account the effect of the undertaking"), with
§ 470a-2 ("take into account the effect of the undertaking").
186. Compare 16 U.S.C. § 470f ("shall ... take into account the effect of the undertaking on
any [property] that is included in or eligible for inclusion in the National Register"), with § 470a-
2 ("Prior to the approval of any Federal undertaking outside the United States which may di-
rectly and adversely affect a property which is ... on the applicable country's equivalent of the
National Register").
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that could be considered eligible for protection but that is not actually
listed on the equivalent to a National Register.
Furthermore, the purpose of the 1980 amendments to the NHPA, of
which § 402 is a part, was in part to implement the United States'
participation in the World Heritage Convention.187 To that end, § 402
requires that federal agencies also mitigate the adverse effects of their
actions on property that is "on the World Heritage List. ' 188 The
World Heritage List was known to Congress since at least 1973, the
year that Congress deposited the United States instrument of ratifica-
tion for the World Heritage Convention.' 89 Clearly, the method of
cultural property preservation most familiar to Congress at the time
that it developed § 402 was a register-based method that individually
lists individual culturally or historically significant properties for pro-
tection. The most reasonable conclusion with respect to the
equivalency standard, therefore, is that Congress simply did not in-
tend to extend the protections of § 402 to property that is not actually
"on," in the clearest sense, a register or list.
d. The Need for a Register
The determination that Congress most likely intended that some
sort of register must feature in a country's cultural resource protection
scheme suggests an answer to the question raised at the outset of this
analysis: Must equivalency now be analyzed in terms of a comparison
between the National Register and the foreign country's register, or
between the National Register and the register's authorizing cultural
patrimony law? 190
Without resolving the question, or even raising it, the Dugong
court's equivalency analysis suggests that the comparison does not
need to take place solely at a register-to-register level. In finding that
the Japanese and American registers had a corresponding "effect or
function," the court effectively said that they were equivalent simply
because they were both lists. In other words, they both individually
designated, or listed, properties that were deemed historically or cul-
turally significant under the standards of their authorizing statutes
(and in the case of the National Register, implementing regulations),
187. See McHuGH, supra note 35, at CRS-2.
188. 16 U.S.C. § 470a-2.
189. See McHUGH, supra note 35, at CRS-2.
190. See supra notes 110-122 and accompanying text.
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and they thus had corresponding effects; likewise, because they were
both lists, they had the same function. 191
The significance of the register-statute distinction arises again when
considered against the potential that § 402's "take into account" re-
quirement could apply to cultural properties that are fully protected
under a cultural patrimony law but that are not designated by name
on a corresponding register. If Congress intended that a foreign law
utilize a register, as appears to be the case, 192 asking whether the law
or the register is equivalent to the National Register is a distinction
without a difference-whether the bottom-line point of comparison is
made at the register or authorizing statute level, a register is required.
If a country has a system like Egypt's, designating broad categories of
property for protection and also listing specific property on a register,
the law has the same effect and function as the National Register-"to
designate the cultural and historical heritage of the nation for special
protections... [by] using the mechanism of a cultural protection regis-
ter.1 93 Because the language of § 402 does not require that federal
agencies take into account the impact of their actions on properties
that are eligible for listing on another country's equivalent register, the
agency must only take care with respect to listed properties, as was the
case in the United States until 1971.194
B. The Nature of the Protected Property
Just as the nature of historic preservation legislation varies consid-
erably from country to country, so too does the value that different
cultures place on the preservation of objects, scenery, knowledge, and
expression. While some nations restrict statutory cultural resource
protection to tangible properties, others extend preservation efforts
and protection to intangible cultural properties, such as traditional
music and dance or folkloric manners and customs. 195 Some recog-
nize living creatures such as animals as cultural property requiring leg-
islative protection, whereas others do not.196 Even those countries
191. Okinawa Dugong v. Rumsfeld, No. C 03-4350 MHP, 2005 WL 522106, at *7 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 2, 2005).
192. See supra notes 180-189 and accompanying text.
193. Id.
194. See 16 U.S.C. § 470a-2 (emphasis added).
195. See, e.g., Protection of Cultural Properties Act, art. 2(1)(2), 2(1)(4) (1950) (last amended
2002) (Republic of Korea), available at www.unesco.org/culture/natlaws/medialpdf/repub-
licofkorea/kp-actprotecultproprties..engtno.pdf [hereinafter Cultural Properties Act (Korea)].
196. Compare id. art. 2(1)3(c) (expressly designating "animals" as a protectable category of
cultural property), with 36 C.F.R. § 60.30) (2009) (providing only inanimate examples of protect-
able "objects").
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that emphasize the conservation of tangible, inanimate properties vary
in the degree to which they extend legislative protection to both im-
movable and movable properties. 197 As the Dugong court noted, the
language of § 402 may present a question as to whether § 402's protec-
tions extend to properties that differ in nature from those that the
NHPA protects, either to negate the equivalency of a law that is other-
wise equivalent to the National Register in effect or function, or to bar
application of § 402 to those properties even when they are protected
under a foreign law that fully qualifies as equivalent of the National
Register.198
An argument using the nature of property protected under a for-
eign national historic preservation scheme as a basis for challenging
the application of § 402 might proceed in one of two ways. First, one
might read the equivalency requirement as standing for the premise
that because the foreign nation's law protects classes of property that
are not recognized by the National Register (i.e., it is a class of prop-
erty that would not fit under the definition of a "district, site, building,
structure, or object"), the entire law cannot be the "equivalent" of the
National Register. 199 Second, one might interpret the language of
§ 402 as allowing a foreign law to be equivalent to the National Regis-
ter regardless of the way in which it classifies property for protection,
but negating the applicability of § 402 where the actual property at
issue is not a type that is protected under the NHPA.200 The first in-
terpretation is a challenge to the equivalency of the law, and the sec-
ond is a selective application of § 402 to an otherwise equivalent law.
The Dugong court addressed both possible interpretations, beginning
with the first.
1. Nature of the Property As Negating Equivalency
The Department of Defense in Dugong v. Gates presented an inter-
pretation of § 402 suggesting that because the dugong listed for pro-
tection under the Japanese Law was an animate creature, a
classification of property not recognized by the National Register, the
Japanese Law could not be the equivalent of the National Register
197. Compare Law 117 (Egypt) (translation by UNESCO), supra note 144 (designating as
state-protected "antiquities" any movable object that is over one hundred years old and that has
historical or archaeological importance as the creation of Egyptian civilizations), with 36 C.F.R.
§ 60.30) (including in the category of "objects" only a property that is "related to a specific
setting or environment").
198. Okinawa Dugong v. Rumsfeld, No. C 03-4350 MHP, 2005 WL 522106, at *8 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 2, 2005).
199. See infra notes 201-208 and accompanying text.
200. See infra notes 209-215 and accompanying text.
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under § 402.201 This interpretation of the equivalency standard takes
on a greater significance if § 402 is read to require that the
equivalency exist between the National Register and the other coun-
try's register, as opposed to its underlying cultural patrimony law.20 2
In that case, because the two registers would be inherently identical in
form-each a list of cultural properties-the distinctions between the
two registers would be found primarily or exclusively in the type of
properties that formed the list. Equivalency between the two registers
would then necessarily depend either upon the complete absence of
an inequivalent category of property from the foreign country's regis-
ter, or upon a preponderance of the types-or actual number-of
properties that are listed on the foreign register and that constitute the
same type of property as those eligible for listing on the National
Register.203
The Dugong court did not find that theory persuasive.20 4 The court
found the commonalities between the two laws to be more significant
than the differences, and it reasoned that allowing the nature of the
property at issue to serve as the primary factor to overcome the equiv-
alence of the two historic preservation schemes would contradict the
entire purpose of § 402's extension of domestic protections to nations
that are culturally distinct from the United States.20 5 The court em-
phasized that the Japanese Law's basis for listing the dugong-its cul-
tural and historical importance to the Okinawan people of Japan-
was the significant factor. 20 6
Although a property-based equivalency standard would probably
significantly benefit federal agencies by rendering § 402-eligible prop-
erty consistent across borders and more readily identifiable, the Du-
gong court's interpretation of the relationship between the type of
property and the equivalency of the foreign law has better support in
the legislative purpose of § 402. Congress enacted § 402 to fulfill the
United States' commitments under the World Heritage Convention,
which, in the view of Congress, "leaves it to each participating nation
to identify and delineate the meritorious heritage properties situated
201. Rumsfeld, 2005 WL 522106, at *6.
202. See the discussion of the register-or-law distinction supra notes 190-194 and accompany-
ing text.
203. Under this interpretation, the converse could be true as well: a property-oriented inter-
pretation of the equivalency standard might recognize as "equivalent" all foreign historic preser-
vation laws, regardless of their effect or function, when the nature of the property at issue is
equivalent to a type of property that is protected in the United States by its inscription in the
National Register.
204. Rumsfeld, 2005 WL 522106, at *6-7.
205. Id.
206. Id. at *7.
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within its own territory. '20 7 This is a particularly informative state-
ment in light of the fact that the United States was the primary archi-
tect of the Convention, as well as its first ratifying state. 208 Therefore,
it is unlikely that Congress intended a property-based interpretation
of the equivalency standard to prevail, considering that § 402 would
most likely apply only to countries with a decidedly Western concept
of the value of property.
2. Nature of the Property As Restrictive of the Types of Resources
Eligible for § 402 Protection
In light of the above analysis, any limitation on the scope of proper-
ties to which § 402 may apply must only operate selectively-but does
the equivalency standard mandate that certain types of properties be
excluded from consideration? The Department of Defense in Dugong
suggested that it does.20 9 The government argued that only tangible,
inanimate properties are eligible for protections under § 402 because
§ 402 requires federal agencies to regard "property which is on the
World Heritage List or on the applicable country's equivalent of the
National Register," and because the National Register protects only
tangible, inanimate properties. 210 The district court did not address
whether proving that a foreign cultural property is also a "property"
under the NHPA's statutory framework is a baseline requirement for
protection under § 402. Instead, the court treated the dugong as an
"object" as defined in the NHPA regulations.211
Here, as before, the language and intent behind § 402 informs an
investigation into whether the equivalency standard requires that only
certain types of "equivalent" property be taken into consideration
prior to an agency's undertaking. Congress used the term
"equivalent" to describe the relationship between a foreign nation's
historic preservation law or register to the National Register, not to
inform an analysis of the type of property that must be considered. 212
In addition, the full scope of protection under § 402 extends to
properties on the World Heritage List, which consists of properties
that would not be recognized as eligible for inclusion in the National
Register, even under the Dugong court's stripped-down "property,"
207. SEN. COMM. ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RES., NATIONAL HISTORIC PRESERVATION ACT
AMENDMENTS OF 1980, S. REP. No. 96-943, at 43 (1980), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6406.
208. McHUGH, supra note 33, at CRS-2.
209. Rurnsfeld, 2005 WL 522106, at *7.
210. Id.
211. Id. at *9.
212. See 16 U.S.C. 470a-2.
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as opposed to "historic property," standard. 213 For example, the cate-
gory of natural heritage is recognized on the World Heritage List; by
contrast, the National Register does not list properties for protection
without some significant connection to human beings.214 A federal
agency conducting an undertaking that might adversely affect a World
Heritage Site is required to consider the effects of its actions on that
property.2 15 If a country has decided that certain landscapes have cul-
tural significance to its population, for example, limiting the applica-
tion of § 402 to the types of property that the National Register
protects would promote an absurd result: the agency would be re-
quired to accept the foreign nation's determination that a cultural
landscape is significant if it is listed on the World Heritage List, but it
would be able to reject that determination when the same class of
property is at issue, but the property's significance is national, rather
than global, in scope.
3. Only Properties Actually Designated Under Foreign Law As
Culturally or Historically Significant Should Be Eligible for
§ 402 Protection
Considering the wide variety in properties that an agency may con-
front in its quest to comply with § 402, where can a baseline be
drawn? The criteria for nominating properties to the World Heritage
List are based entirely on the significance of the property to the global
community, judged by one or more of six possible standards. 216 More-
over, the eligibility criteria for listing properties on the National Reg-
ister is based on that property's significance to American history,
architecture, archaeology, engineering, and culture.21 7 In order to en-
sure that federal agencies operating overseas are on notice that they
must consider the impact of their actions on historically and culturally
significant foreign properties, § 402's process should apply only to
properties-as defined under the foreign law-that are designated for
protection under the foreign law, and only when those designations
are based on their significance to the people of that nation.
213. Id.
214. The National Register category closest to natural heritage protection would probably be
"sites," which requires a connection to the human race as an element of the eligibility criteria.
"A site is the location of a significant event, a prehistoric or historic occupation or activity, or a
building or structure, whether standing, ruined, or vanished, where the location itself maintains
historical or archeological value regardless of the value of any existing structure." 36 C.F.R.
60.3() (2008).
215. 16 U.S.C. 470a-2.
216. World Heritage Centre, Criteria for Selection, http://whc.unesco.org/en/criteria/ (last vis-
ited Apr. 2, 2009). There are ten criteria, but only six apply to cultural property. See id.
217. See 16 U.S.C. § 470a(a)(1)(A).
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In other words, if a foreign law determines that a certain intangible
cultural property (such as traditional knowledge of the medicinal uses
of a plant) or a folkloric custom (such as a dance or ritual) is culturally
or historically significant and worthy of protection, but does not desig-
nate for protection the land on which these activities exist on the inde-
pendent basis of the land's significance (such as its necessity to the
preservation of the knowledge or custom), a § 402 analysis should be
limited only to the cultural property that is actually designated for
protection-the custom itself. If the equivalent foreign law does not
protect the land for cultural or historic reasons, agencies operating
within the paradigm of the NHPA and the World Heritage Conven-
tion, which only protect properties based on their significance to na-
tional and world heritage, should not be expected to infer that
anything other than the designated property itself must be accorded
consideration.
Consider a hypothetical scenario: In willing compliance with its re-
sponsibilities under the NHPA, a federal agency operating in a coun-
try that protects intangible cultural property would first seek to
discover if a cultural patrimony law exists, and next, whether that law
or its register was the "equivalent of the National Register." Listed
on the register may be the traditional knowledge of an ancient style of
building construction.218 The agency would recognize the traditional
knowledge as intangible property that is listed for protection and is
thus eligible for § 402's compliance process, which most likely includes
some amount of consultation with local community and preservation
groups in order to further investigate the federal undertaking's poten-
tial for harmful effects on the intangible property.219 However, if the
agency has no way of determining whether the area in which it is oper-
ating has any connection whatsoever to the protected intangible cul-
tural property, it has no notice that the consultation process under
§ 402 should commence. 220 As a result, the agency will most likely not
218. See, e.g., Cultural Properties Act (Korea), supra note 195, art. 2(1)2, 2(1)4.
219. The District Court for the Northern District of California took up this issue in Okinawa
Dugong v. Gates. There, the court found that the bare bones "take into account" process under
§ 402 required
(1) identification of protected property, (2) generation, collection, consideration, and
weighing of information pertaining to how the undertaking will affect the historic prop-
erty, (3) a determination as to whether there will be adverse effects or no adverse ef-
fects, and (4) if necessary, development and evaluation of alternatives or modifications
to the undertaking that could avoid or mitigate the adverse effects.
543 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1104 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
220. See 16 U.S.C. 470a-2, which requires the Federal agency to take into account the effect of
an undertaking on such properties "prior to the approval of any Federal undertaking." Id. (em-
phasis added).
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seek to initiate consultation based on the listed property, and it will
not know to mitigate the adverse effects of its undertaking on the
traditional knowledge.221
In another variation on this scenario, the agency may recognize that
actions it intends to take will adversely impact this traditional knowl-
edge, and it may engage in measures to mitigate the harmful effects by
creating an arrangement whereby the holders of the protected knowl-
edge agree to relocate to another area. Having thus faithfully trav-
ersed the complexities of complying with the NHPA in an
international context, requiring the agency to further "take into ac-
count" the impact of the undertaking on an undesignated area in
which this knowledge has traditionally been accumulated or prac-
ticed-for example, without any notice to the agency that the land is
also protected-would ask more of the agency than § 402 requires.222
In a statutory analysis in which so many variables exist, this seems
an appropriate place to limit the reach of § 402.
IV. CONCLUSION
The ambiguity of the language "equivalent of the National Regis-
ter" in § 402 leaves federal agencies undertaking action overseas with-
out clear guidance as to whether a country has an official preservation
scheme in place and whether that scheme is "equivalent," so as to
trigger the requirements of § 402.223 As a result, the agency may not
know whether there are cultural or historically significant resources
that must be taken into account prior to undertaking the action, and
foreign populations cannot rely on § 402 to supply the protection that
it purports to offer.224 Understanding the baseline requirements for
what foreign legislation would need to be in order to qualify as
"equivalent of the National Register" would reduce the burden on
federal agencies acting overseas by providing them with the parame-
ters for taking the first step under § 402's process-identifying the his-
torically or culturally significant properties.
The court in Dugong shed some light on the requirements of § 402
by articulating criteria by which a foreign cultural property law may
be deemed equivalent to the National Register. The court's broad in-
terpretation of "equivalent" as requiring a corresponding effect or
function in the foreign law, interpreted with reference to the text, stat-
utory context, and legislative history of § 402, indicates that the for-
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
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eign law will most likely need to utilize some form of a register-based
mechanism as a baseline requirement in order to qualify for
equivalency under the NHPA.
In addition, a liberal extension of NHPA's protections to different
types of property is warranted by the legislative history and text of
§ 402. Whether a foreign protected resource constitutes "property"
should be considered by reference to the definitions developed by that
foreign country rather than the limited conception of protection-wor-
thy property espoused by the NHPA. Limiting the scope of protection
to the types of properties that the National Register recognizes under-
mines the internationalism of § 402, which is to allow foreign nations
to determine what properties-and what types of properties-are sig-
nificant to their history and cultural heritage. However, the reach of
§ 402 should be limited to only those that are properties actually des-
ignated for their cultural or historic significance, or their necessity to
the preservation of such a designated property. In that way, U.S.
agencies operating overseas will know from examining the equivalent
foreign register that a property must be considered. Therefore, the
interpretation of "equivalent of the National Register" that hews clos-
est to § 402's language, statutory context, and legislative purpose, is
that equivalency requires, at a minimum, that a country maintain a
register of culturally significant property.
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